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Abstract - The existence of an economic dividend - in terms of regional disparities - 
of the global devolutionary trend registered over the past three decades is still 
ambiguous both on theoretical and empirical grounds and it is likely to be case-
specific. With respect to the Italian case it has been argued that since 1996, even in 
an indirect way, a negative effect of devolution on regional disparities arose. 
However, our empirical analysis suggests that the decline in Italian regional 
disparities over the decade 1996-2006 has been decisively driven by the dynamic of 
population and, to some extent, by the loss of competitiveness and consequent low 
relative performance of northern regions. Therefore, the link between devolution and 
spatial disparities appears to be rather spurious and, if any, its beneficial effect has 
been uneven both in time and space. 
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1. Introduction 
Increasing pressures towards decentralisation have been worldwide registered 
beginning from 1970s (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003;). This global trend has a 
theoretical background stemming from fiscal federalism literature (Oates 1972; Oates 
1999) and principally based on beneficial effects of citizen’s participation, 
accountability and transparency (Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2005) enhanced by 
Tiebout (1956)’s foot voting mechanism. 
On the empirical side the focus is on growth-effects and much less attention has been 
paid to the effects of devolution in terms of spatial disparities (Calamai 2009; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2004; Pike, Rodrìguez-Pose et al., 2010; Tselios, 
Rodrìguez-Pose et al. 2011).  The empirical evidence developed by these studies is 
rather mixed, demonstrating that the effects of devolution on spatial disparities are 
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case-specific. This  consideration raises the circumstance for further research based 
on single country case-study.   
We recognise that, with regard to the Italian case, it has been argued  that a beneficial 
effect of the devolutionary process beginning in 1995 - in terms of reduction of 
spatial disparities - arose, even if an indirect way (Calamai 2009). Indeed, over the 
ten years following first introduction of devolutionary measures in Italy, a significant 
reduction of regional disparities is registered and in the Italian context this 
phenomenon will rather necessarily result in a reduction of the North-South divide.   
However, we believe that the negative correlation between the increase in (the 
measure of) devolution and the decrease in spatial disparities is rather misleading. 
Indeed, closely considering the relative socio-economic performance of Italian 
regions, our interpretation of this downturn in spatial disparities changes in favour of 
a more articulated framework. Indeed, as first critical evidence should be considered 
that in the decade 1996-2006 the relative position of Italian regions with respect to 
GDP (percapita), as shown in Figure 1 below, remained unchanged therefore 
reproducing the same North-South divide.       
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
This persistent dualism should be not neglected in interpreting the reduction of 
regional disparities, in terms of Gross Disposable Household Income (GDHI) 
percapita, shown in Graph 1  
 
INSERT GRAPH 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
As already mentioned, this phenomenon has been linked with the devolutionary 
trend, claiming for a desirable disparities-reducing link between devolution and 
regional disparities (Calamai, 2009) basing the analysis essentially on the opposite 
trend of (the measure of) devolution and (the measure of) regional disparities  
 
 INSERT GRAPH 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
In Calamai (2009)’s words 
Since the 1996, the North-South gap, which had been increasing constantly since the 1980s, started to 
show a significant decline. In addition, the partial association between the two phenomena is further 
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supported by their markedly high correlation coefficient of 0.89 (statistically significant at the 0.1% 
level), which suggests, for the period under consideration, a strong positive correlation between this 
measure of devolution and the downturn in regional per capita differentials (Calamai, 2009, p. 1140,  
emphasis added). 
The mechanism throw which the devolutionary process would operate could be 
illustrated according to following  scheme proposed by Calamai (2009) 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The idea expressed in Figure 2, building on Azfar, Kahkonen et al. (1999),  is as 
follows.  Devolution, by means of proximity to the electorate and enhanced 
accountability of local governments, accompanied by a well-developed social fabric 
and civil society, indirectly stimulates  economic growth and generates “a cumulative 
and self-reinforcing phenomenon, in which economic dynamism nurtures its 
legitimacy and thus feeds back into the devolutionary push” (Calamai, 2009, p. 
1147). This process is further stimulated by regional policy via both the increased 
autonomy and Europeanisation of development policy.  
 
We believe that the operation of this theoretical framework is worth empirically 
testing. Put differently, since “decentralization is not an end in itself but rather should 
be designed and evaluated for its ability to achieve broader objectives of […] equity, 
efficiency, quality and financial soundness” (Bossert, 1998, p.1513), as contribution 
to the political and economic debate, it is worth empirically exploring to what extent  
the supposed virtuosos cycle stemming from the devolution process operates.  
 
The first element to be taken into account is represented by Italian regional policy 
and its devolved implementation. Therefore, next section will place Italian regional 
policy in the appropriate historical perspective briefly reviewing empirical studies 
concerning its effectiveness in reducing regional disparities. Section 3 considers the 
evolution of pivotal socio-economic factors, linked to the devolutionary process, 
involved in the economic performance of Italian regions with particular regard to the 
eventual shift in Southern variables able to explain the regional convergence 
registered over the period considered. Section 4 addresses the issue of ‘what could 
cause the reduction of regional disparities?’ proposing a reading in terms of 
population dynamic and Northern relative performance. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Regional  policy and regional disparities in Italy 
 
The long history of Italian economic dualism dates back to the unification process in 
1861 and ever since many policies dealing with this dualism followed one another. A 
complete review of policies and their effectiveness goes beyond this paper’s purpose 
and interested readers are addressed, for example, to Spadavecchia (2007) and Del 
Monte and De Luzenberger (1989), or, in a comparative perspective, to Bachtler, 
Wishlade et al. (2001). 
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In general terms, regional policy in Italy has been implemented according to different 
main objectives over time.  In the post WWII period (and until 1980s) it was argued 
that the consistent gap between the two macro-areas of the country was principally 
due to insufficient infrastructure endowment, especially intended as physical capital 
(both private and public), resulting in a relative low labour productivity and high 
transportation costs (Cellini, 2004). Therefore, during the first phase of Intervento 
Straordinario (Special Aid Policy) regional intervention measures, based on the 
special institution Cassa per le opere straordinarie di pubblico interesse per il 
Mezzogiorno1, more often called Cassa del Mezzogiorno (Southern Italy Fund), were 
limited to the South (namely, eight southern Italian regions: Abruzzo, Molise, 
Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia and Sardegna) with the main aim to 
fill the infrastructural gap. During this period many civil infrastructures construction 
(waterworks, electricity, roads, etc.) have been accompanied by the land reform2. In 
short, this reform comported an extensive land expropriation in specific areas where 
large estates were concentrated; expropriated lands have been divided into small 
units of 5-6 hectares and these units have been assigned and sold by the government 
to landless agricultural workers (Gaetani D'Aragona, 1954). All in all, during its first 
ten years (1950-1959), although with the contradiction consisting in the 
fragmentation of the agriculture production system (probably) responding to the 
hidden political objective to organise the southern dependency (Bagnasco, 1984), 
regional policy officially aimed to create ‘prerequisites’ for future southern 
industrialisation process, while alleviating, in the short term, the severe 
unemployment problem (Giordano and Greco, 2003).  However, according to Del 
Monte and De Luzenberger (1989, p.222) the policy of public works realised in this 
period, rather than being propulsive, was mainly of a social nature: “one cannot 
therefore speak of infrastructure policy with pre-industrialization characteristics, as 
the public works in question were not directly connected with a plan for future 
development”. Therefore, according to the authors, a real policy of industrialization 
in the South was postponed to 1957. 
 
Indeed, the following phase, during the 1960s, was characterised by higher emphasis 
on active industrialisation also with the aim to relocate economic activities from the 
economic core areas in the Centre-North to the depressed regions in the South. 
Policy measures were oriented both to capital and workforce. Regarding the former, 
principally in order to overcome the lack of external economies, they included the 
creation of growth poles via the instruments of (i) financial incentives (e.g. subsidies, 
capital grants and loans at a subsidized rate),  (ii) fiscal  incentives (e.g. exemption 
from profit taxes for industrial capital, exemption of customs duties) and (iii) direct 
investment by state-controlled enterprises (under the Act No. 634, reiterating 
measures regarding public investments provided in 1950 Act. No. 646, at least 40% 
of their total investment and 60% of new investments by state controlled enterprises 
were to be located in the South). As for the labour, should be noted that, due to 
                                                          
1
 This institution was implemented in 1950 by Law 646. 
2
 This land reform is based on two acts: the first dated 12nd May 1950 Law 230 (known as Legge Sila 
due to its limitation to the Calabria region) and the second, October 21st of the same year (Law 841), 
extended land expropriation in specific areas where large estates were concentrated (Abruzzi, Molise, 
Puglia, Sicilia, Sardinia, Lazio, southern Toscana, Po river delta region).  
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national labour agreements allowing for different wages linked with the cost of living 
on geographical base (gabbie salariali, wage cages) which resulted in a wage 
differential 10 per cent larger than the productivity differential, the South enjoyed 
lower costs per unit of production (Helg, Peri et al., 2000). Nevertheless, the kind of 
industry developed in the South was capital intensive because of the distortion 
created by the capital-based  system of incentives and these industries did not 
generate substantial multiplier effects (Smith, 1981). 
A third phase of strengthened regional policy in favour of South was developed 
during the period between 1969 and 1973 characterised  by (i) an increase from 50% 
to 70% of tax free profits reinvested in the South and (ii) a reduction of 20%  of the 
payroll tax for each worker hired after 1968. Moreover, (iii) state-owned  enterprises’ 
investments in the South rose from 44% in the period 1957-68 to 58% in the period 
1969-73 (Del Monte and De Luzenberger, 1989). 
 
A final phase of regional policy decreasingly concentrated to the industrial 
development of the South was introduced by 1976 Act No. 183 (i) simplifying 
applications procedures, (ii) fixing the subsidized interest rate equal to 30% of the 
market rate only for investment lower than 15 billion lire (rather than the previous 
fixed and predetermined figure) and (iii) introducing full payroll exemptions for 
workers hired by manufacturing firms after 1 July 1976. 
 
Results achieved during these two decades of regional policy were very weak.   The 
net increase of 608,554 in industrial employment in the south was disappointingly 
small and the policy based on growth poles was unsuccessful in developing  local 
private market-oriented industries (Smith, 1981) generating what was called a 
process of ‘industrialisation without development’ (Saraceno , 1980).  
Partially due to substantial policy ineffectiveness, in addition to EU pressures for 
higher competitiveness and reduction of state aid to domestic industry, the political 
paradigm about the development of Southern Italy shifted from regional industrial 
policy, based on Special Aid Policy3, to direct intervention on household income and 
further (during the 1990s) on Ordinary Intervention.    
Graph 3 graphically shows the evolution of regional policy, during the period from 
1950 to 1981, utilising of two indices adapted from Del Monte and De Luzenberger 
(1989). The first index - IRIP (Index of Regional Industrial Policy) -  focuses on 
industrial regional policy and is obtained by dividing the sum of investment in public 
and semi-public enterprises in Southern Italy (Is), financial aid for the development 
of Southern Italy industry in the form of subsidised interest loans to industries (Fs) 
and investment grants in Southern Italy (G) by the  national equivalent figures 
(respectively I, F, G) . In symbols we have  
IRIP = [(Is + Fs + G) / (I+F+G)]*100 
                                                          
3
 Special Aid Policy was definitively abolished in 1992. 
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As for the second - IRP (Index of Regional Policy) - it is a general index of regional 
policy obtained by dividing the sum of investment in public and semipublic 
enterprises in Southern Italy (Is), subsidised interest loans for the development of 
Southern Italy (Fs), investment grants in Southern Italy (G),  public consumption in 
the South (Cm), and investment in public works in the South (IPm) by the  national 
equivalent datum (respectively, I, F, C, and IP). Therefore, in symbols we have 
IRP = [(Is + Fs + G + Cs + IPs) / (l + F + G + C + IP)]. 
Graph 3 below reports the evolution of both indices. 
 
INSER GRAPH 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Regarding the evolution of regional disparities over the whole period the period 
1952-1992,  a strong reduction, concentrated in the period between 1953-1965, of 
disparities has been registered with the dispersion index (at provincial level) 
decreasing more than half over the sample considered (OECD, 2001); it is worth 
noting that this evidence is similar to that of other European regions during the 
‘Golden Age’ of European convergence (Temple, 2001). 
 
Beginning from the end of the 1990s a New phase of Regional Policy (NRP) has 
been settled principally as response to the dramatic crisis involving public finance 
and, more generally, political representation. The theoretical background of NRP is 
based on New Economic Geograghpy (NEG) with emphasis on growth enhancing 
environmental factors and on improvement of social capital as fundamental 
endogenous factors particularly missing in the South (Cannari, Magnani et al., 2009). 
 
EU regional policy became pivotal in national state policy both in terms of financial 
effort and mutated procedures. As pointed out, between others, by Aiello and Pupo 
(2009), over the period 1996-2006 the total amount of Structural Funds received by 
Italy was more than 110 billion Euro. EU support was distributed coherently with 
their spatial redistributive aim as shown by Graph 4 below reporting that during the 
period 1996-2008 the South received a share of total transfers coming from EU 
ranging between 70% and 87% of total Italian transfers.   
 
 
INSERT GRAPH 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
More precisely, the South received funds equivalent to  about 11% of the total 
investments and 40% of public investments substantially higher than the Centre-
North datum, respectively 1.4% and 9.5%. In addition to the magnitude of spatial  
redistributive effort, these figures confirm also the strong (and persistent) 
dependency of Southern economy from policy measures (Aiello and Pupo, 2009). 
Coherently with the aim of this paper we focus on the debate regarding the 
effectiveness of policy measures in reducing regional disparities. 
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As noted by Calamai (2009) empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of EU 
regional policy  is mixed. Aggregate studies range from substantial policy 
ineffectiveness in enhancing growth highlighting their substantial role being limited 
to merely income-support measure (Boldrin and Canova, 2001; Rodrìguez-Pose and 
Fratesi 2004) to  positive effect in enhancing the economic performance of European 
periphery (Leonardi, 2006) and significant support on income and employment 
growth in Objective 1 regions (Martin and Tyler, 2006). A similar mixed situation 
arise when Italy as single case-study is considered. Indeed, Loddo (2006) finds a 
positive and significant effect of Structural Funds on regional convergence during the 
1994-2004 period even if with different shades, given that expenditure allocated by 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) “has medium term positive and 
significant returns while support to agriculture has short-term positive effects on 
growth which wane quickly” (Loddo, 2006, p.1). Furthermore, in her article, Loddo 
(2006, p.1) point out that her results  “cast some doubt both on the (i) distributive 
efficiency of resources allocated by ESF and (ii) on the effectiveness of the 
intervention policies in support to education, Human capital and employment”. 
 
However, Aiello and Pupo (2009) in a more recent study, note that during a period of 
25 years (form 1980 to 2007), “no variation is found in the regional order: the 
regions in which the GDP per-capita was, at the beginning of the period, below the 
national average occupy the same position at the end of the period (the correlation 
between the series of regional GDP per-capita at the beginning and the end of the 
period is 0.95)” (Aiello and Pupo, 2009, p.1). Moreover, with regard to the 
magnitude of discrepancy they note also that ”in 2006-2007 the income of an 
inhabitant of the richest region (Valley d'Aosta) is, on average, 2.6 times higher than 
that of an inhabitant of the poorest region (Calabria)” (Aiello and Pupo, 2009, p.1). 
 
Focusing the attention on the impact of EU regional policy, their empirical analysis, 
taking into account the non-observable regional heterogeneity, the small-sample bias 
and the possible endogeneity of Structural Funds, achieve the conclusion that “it 
must be noted that the divide between the regions has not changed over time and, 
therefore, even if the increase of the infrastructure endowment has contributed to 
determine a greater impact of the spending in the Mezzogiorno, it is evident that the 
European cohesion policy has not fully reached the set objective, that is to reduce the 
disparities inside each member state” (Aiello and Pupo, 2009, p.13). More precisely, 
they find a positive impact of EU funds (0.081 or 0.09 according to different 
estimation technique, LSDVC or GMM-SYS respectively), but the magnitude of 
their estimates implies that, for example, a 10% increase in per-capita EU spending, 
on average, results in an increase of the GDP per-capita of about 0.9% or 0.81% 
according to estimator applied. On this point the author note that Loddo (2006)’s 
higher estimate of 1.11 can depend on the fact that, in comparison to the Loddo 
(2006) study, the estimators used in their work control for the small size of the 
sample, for the endogenous nature of the regressors and, finally, for the business-
cycle effects (Aiello and Pupo, 2009, p. 10). Therefore the authors conclude that 
 
It is reasonable to think […] that the increase of the average rate of growth of the percapita income in 
the South of Italy is simply determined by the European transfers that have mostly interested the 
southern area of the country. Therefore, what could appear at first as a positive signal for the solution 
of the problem of the dependence of the southern economy on external resources is nothing more than 
the result of that same dependence […]. (Aiello and Pupo, 2009, p. 13). 
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As possible explanation of this substantial ineffectiveness of regional policy in 
reducing North-South divide could be found in Milio (2007) both in terms of 
implementation rate (Italian regions, even if with significant exception such as 
Abruzzo, Molise, and Basilicata, had the lowest implementation rate over the 1989-
1993 and the 1994-1999 period) and of broader administrative capacity and criminal 
pervasion in public activities (Cannari, Magnani et al., 2009). Indeed, at least until 
1992, the southern regions beneficiated of a regional policy characterised by a 
generalized distribution of expenditures over southern Italy rather than in target areas 
with no long-term planning and with deficient monitoring or evaluation procedures 
(Trigilia, 1992; Milio, 2007)  
 
To the case at hand, it is worth stressing that there are strong arguments based both 
on strictly empirical – regarding the magnitude of their impact (Loddo, 2006; Aiello 
and Pupo, 2009) - and on political and theoretical grounds (Milio, 2007) to cast 
considerable doubts that (EU) regional policy, through the positive interaction with 
the devolution process, over the period under consideration, achieved the persistent 
reducing effect on regional disparities reported in GRAPH 1.  
An alternative measure of regional redistributive policy, not yet considered in 
previous studies regarding the Italian, case has been  proposed by Pike, Rodrìguez-
Pose et al. (2010). This general measure of policy consists of the difference between 
the Gini index calculated on primary household income per head – i.e. before direct 
state intervention on household income – and the same index calculated on 
disposable income per head. Therefore, the latter takes into account direct policy 
intervention by means of both positive elements such as social benefits received and 
other current transfers received (total secondary resources) and negative elements 
such as current taxes on income and wealth (e.g. income tax, council tax), social 
contributions paid and other current transfers paid (total secondary uses). Therefore, 
Policy, by considering policy measures other than taxes, build on the Reynolds and 
Smolensky (1977) index usually calculated to measure the progressiveness of tax 
systems. The evolution of both measures (Gini, Policy) is shown in Graph 5 below.  
 
INSERT GRAPH 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
The Graph shows that, after 2002, an increase in the measure of policy is rather 
constantly (with the exception of 2004) associated with a reduction of regional 
disparities. This empirical evidence seems to confirm the effectiveness of spatial 
redistributive policy in reducing regional disparities. However, the Spearman 
correlation index is negative (-0.5245) and the hypothesis that the two measures are 
independent cannot be rejected at 5% confidence level (the relative p-value is equal 
to 0.08).  
Therefore, empirical analysis, considering both the specific contribution of EU funds 
and the broader spatial redistributive policy, rises serious doubts in order to attribute 
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any substantial disparities-reducing effect to regional policy over the period under 
consideration.    
 
3. Evolution of other relevant factors 
In order to further explore the link between spatial performance and spatial 
disparities in Italy,  building on Cannari, Magnani et al. (2009), in what follows we 
consider  other more specific factors able to influence regional (performance and) 
disparities.  
The bulk of these measures is taken from ISTAT4 and belong to the “Territorial 
Database for Development policy (Banca dati territoriale per le politiche di 
sviluppo) and contains data collected specifically to support policy monitoring and 
evaluation inside the Community Support Framework (Quadro Comunitario di 
Sostegno). The database is composed by about 160 regional indices divided into 
contest indicators (indicatori di contest chiave), and “break variables” (variabili di 
rottura). The latter set consists of 15 selected variables selected to evaluate ex-ante 
the impact of policy actions due to their importance in terms of economic 
externalities to economic development. Therefore, this dataset represent a powerful 
instrument in order to search for a structural change in southern regions, stimulated 
by the devolutionary trend, able to improve their economic performance and, in turn, 
to reduce regional disparities as theoretically predicted, with particular regard to the 
Italian case,  by Calamai (2009)5.        
We consider first a general indicator of social capital, political accountability and 
participation which is represented by turnout for  the  2005 and 2010 regional 
elections considering 13 regions under Statuto Ordinario rule. The rationale for 
considering these regions is twofold. First, because these kind of regions are 
potentially more involved in the increased autonomy arising from the devolutionary 
process (especially under the 2001 Constitutional reform6) than regions already 
enjoying a higher level of autonomy (Statuto Speciale). Second, because in these 
regions elections hold in the same days7 so that, all external factors able to influence 
electoral participation, included economic cycle (Aguilar and Pacek, 2000) could be 
considered equal, making possible the comparison between regions.    
According to devolutionary rhetoric about participation we would expect an increase 
in electoral participation. Indeed, in Scully, Jones et al. (2004) words 
 
                                                          
4
 For further information see http://www.istat.it/ambiente/contesto/infoterr/azioneB.html.  
5
 See also Figure 2. 
6
 Cost. L. 2001, n. 3 "Modifiche al titolo V della parte seconda della Costituzione". Gazzetta Ufficiale 
n. 248,  24th October 2001. 
7
 Except for Basilicata in 2005 that had election between the 17th  and the 18th  April instead of 3rd and 
4th April.  
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By bringing government 'closer to the people' [...] it is suggested that devolution can [...] 
generate a renewed sense of engagement and participation in the political process in the 
territories where it is established (Scully, Jones et al., 2004, p. 519-20).  
 
Furthermore, as already noted, Calamai (2009, p.1146), with particular regard to the 
Italian case, point out that “one of the major arguments pointing to the economic 
benefits of devolution equates proximity to the electorate with the enhanced 
accountability of local governments”. 
 
Graph 6 reports the participation rate for 13 regions under Statuto Ordinario rule 
relative bot to the 2005 and 2010 regional elections. 
 
INSERT GRAPH 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
However, as shown in the Graph, between 2005 and 2010 in all regions considered 
the share of voters declined. The highest reduction has been registered by Lazio (the 
difference between 2005 and 2010 perceptual datum is 11.70), while the lowest has 
been registered in Basilicata (where the difference is 4.38). On average the difference 
between the two perceptual was 7.70. Therefore, it seems that devolution, rather than 
stimulate participation given to ‘closer’ citizens the possibility to ‘have their say’ 
using their voice (Hirschman, 1985) option, was accompanied by a general signal of 
“of public alienation from, and declining trust in, politicians and the political system” 
(Scully, Jones et al., 2004, p. 519) and, especially in the South, this could create a 
self-enhancing vicious cycle since, as a response to this alienation, political 
institutions could become “less 'representative' of the population, and in turn might 
incline policy makers to neglect the interests of social groups among whom electoral 
participation is lowest” (Scully, Jones et al., 2004, p.519). This circumstance, in turn, 
could have negative overall effects on social capital and social cohesion.  
Regardless of its link with participation, the issue of social cohesion is addressed in 
Graph 7 below reporting the evolution of the ISTAT indicator ‘Legality and Social 
Cohesion’ (index “t.09” - Condizioni di legalità e coesione sociale) measured as 
violent crime per 10,000 inhabitants.      
 
INSERT GRAPH 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
Graph 7 shows that, if any, only a negative effect of devolution on legality and social 
cohesion could be traced over the period considered. Indeed, we observe an increase 
on violent crimes –i.e. a decrease in legality and social cohesion – involving all 
macro-areas considered. Furthermore, in terms of North-South divide the Graph 
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shows that, since 2000, the South part of the country experienced a substantial 
increase of violent crimes passing from 14.8 (per inhabitant) in 2000 to 25,3 in 2007 
with an increase of 10.5, while, for example, the North-East datum passed from 10.7 
in 2000 to 17.2 in 2007 experiencing not only lower absolute values but  also a lower 
increase over time (6.5).  
The gap in legality is further confirmed by work conditions. Indeed, considering the 
indices of ‘Irregular Work’ (index “t.08” - Capacità di offrire lavoro regolare), 
South and Islands macroareas shows a share of irregular workers  constantly higher 
(about 2 times) of those of the rest of the country. 
 
INSERT GRAPH 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
It is worth noting that both the ‘Legality’ and the ‘Irregular work’ indices represent 
indirect measure of socio-economic conditions. Going further with the analysis of 
economic performance and considering two direct indices of economic performance 
represented by worker productivity in manufacturing industry (“index IV-13 bis” - 
Produttività del lavoro nell'industria manifatturiera) and and innnovationa ability 
(index ‘IV-19 bis’ - Intensità brevettuale) which represent two keys factor in 
economic performance, the picture appears reversed with  North West constantly 
registering highest values and South macro-area at the bottom of the scale. More 
precisely, for the former, should be noted the relatively better performance of Islands 
(comparable to those of other macro-areas of the country) with respect to the South 
which seems to follow its own (lower) trend. 
 
INSERT GRAPH 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
However, as for the latter, quite impressing, the Graph reproduce the geographical 
order of macro-areas with both Northern areas registering higher values than the 
Central one and, in turn, the Centre performing better than South and Islands. This 
hold for the whole period considered.    
 
INSERT GRAPH 10 ABOUT HERE 
 
In addition to innovation and the strictly manufacture productivity variable, 
considering a completely different kind of ‘production’ activity the variable 
‘Tourism attractiveness’ (index ‘R3’ - Capacità di attrazione dei consumi turistici). 
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Clearly, this variable depends not only on the artistic and cultural ‘heritage’ of each 
macro-areas, but, to greater extent, to the valorisation of the inherited touristic 
patrimony and is linked, at least, with other socio-economic variables considered 
above. Put differenlty, as pointed out by Cellini (2011, p. 452), “it is the valorization 
of the endowment that plays the major role in attracting tourism flows” (on this point 
see also Bille and Schulze, 2008; Bonet, 2003; Cooke and Lazzaretti, 2008). 
However, on the meaning of ‘valorisation’, it is worth noting that this not simply 
coincide with public spending for tourism. Indeed, with respect to the Italian regions, 
Cellini and Torrisi (2009), even finding find that the effectiveness of public spending 
of public spending for tourism on tourism attraction appears to be really weak, 
conclude noting that “that tourism is a very large and composite basket of goods and 
services, and the focus on a subset of factors could be misleading”. 
 
INSERT GRAPH 11 ABOUT HERE 
 
Even in this case the trend registered over the sample considered does not allow to 
argue that any structural change involved the ability of Southern regions to attract 
touristic presences. Indeed, except for North West (belonging to the ‘lower-
attractiveness’ group), the Graph reproduces a ranking of macro-areas substantially 
matching the North-South division of the Country demonstrating the ineffectiveness 
of Southern regions to achieve a development based on tourism economy.         
Finally, the same (reversed) geographical order can be found considering an indirect 
measure of economic performance, that is, considering a ‘break variable’ (variabile 
di rottura) for the economic development, consisting in ‘Economic Dependency’ 
(index ‘R2b’ - Grado di indipendenza economica). Indeed, South and Island 
registered, over the whole period considered, considerably higher values of economic 
dependency than the rest of Italy. More precisely, while all other maro-areas 
registered negative values of economic dependency - meaning that the amount of 
their importation (from ‘the rest of the world’ and from other regions not belonging 
to each macro-area) is lesser than the correspondent amount of exportation – South 
and Islands reported constantly positive and increasing values (the value in 1995 was 
17.8% and 22.5%,while the value in 2007 was 20.3% and 24.8%, respectively).  
 
INSERT GRAPH 12 ABOUT HERE 
 
Therefore, the brief analysis reported in this section, confirms that “almost all 
weaknesses of Italian economy are mostly revealed in the South” (Cannari, Magnani 
et al., 2009, p. 673, our translation). Indeed, also Cannari, Magnani et al. (2011)’s 
analysis confirms a performance of Southern regions “markedly unsatisfactory” 
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(Cannari, Magnani et al. 2009, p.727, our translation). To the case at hand, this 
negative evolution over time of important Southern socio-economic factors makes it 
difficult to link  the reduction of regional disparities experienced over the period 
under consideration to (potential) beneficial effects of devolution. By contrast, the 
link appears rather spurious and highly questionable leaving more open questions 
than at the beginning of the analysis.     
  
4. What could cause the reduction of regional disparities? 
The analysis performed in previous sections essentially demonstrated that no single 
variable taken under consideration registered an historical evolution able to 
empirically explain – through the theoretical mechanism  reported in Figure 2 - the 
persistent reduction in regional disparities registered over the ten-year period from 
1996 to 2006. Therefore, until this point, the analysis – rather than supporting the 
Calamai (2009)’s argument about the desirable opposite relation between regional 
disparities and devolution - leaves us more worries about the possibility of reaching a 
reliable conclusion than it started with.  
Given that the virtuous relationship between decentralisation and other variables 
cannot be confirmed in light of the empirical analysis developed above, the first 
conclusion that could be drawn is based on the argument that the reduction of 
disparities, rather than representing the result of endogenous factors fostering 
economic performance, is primarily driven by the strong redistributive effort 
operated by the state. 
This argument is confirmed by Graph 13 below reporting the evolution of primary 
and disposable household income (as share of Italy total primary and disposable 
household income, respectively) according to macro-area over the period 1995-2009.   
 
INSERT GRAPH 13 ABOUT HERE 
 
Indeed, from Graph 13 it is evident that the Southern part of the state is the unique 
one with a share of disposable income (i.e. after state intervention) substantially 
higher than primary income (i.e. before state intervention). Furthermore, it is worth 
stressing that (i) this circumstance is strongly persistent over time and that (ii) despite 
this strong between (regions) redistributive effort and the observed reduction of 
regional disparities over time, as noted also by Torrisi (2010), the within relative 
poverty is substantially stable over time, with the South registering a share of relative 
poverty (23.38% on average, ranging from 21,6 in 2003 to 25 in 2004) more than 
two times those of other  macro-area of the country with the North ranging from 
4.5% (in 2005) to 6% (in 1997) and the Centre ranging from 5.8% (in 2003) to 9.7% 
14 
 
(in 2000). Graphs 14 below reports the complete evolution of macro-areas’ relative 
poverty for the period from 1997 to 2007. 
 
INSERT GRAPH 14 ABOUT HERE 
 
Therefore, Graph 14 confirms that the reduction of regional disparities observed over 
the period under investigation has not been accompanied with a correspondent 
reduction of within disparities (rather relative poverty) and this circumstance in itself 
is another factor that casts doubts on the link between devolution and disparities. 
Indeed, one of key argument in favour  of devolution is based on better targeted 
policies due to an higher information set available at local level.  
To the case at hand, considering redistribution as a public good (Pauly, 1973) and 
adopting the (Hochman and Rodgers (1969)’s approach based on interdependence of 
utilities function between rich and poor, redistributive effort theoretically could also 
be more Pareto-efficient in a decentralised setting. Nevertheless, our empirical 
analysis confirms that the devolutionary process, in all Italian macro-areas 
considered, was unable to produce any significant effect on this regard. Therefore, 
our empirical analysis confirms that, regardless of the underlying dynamic, 
devolution  - if any – had a limited effect in reducing between disparities without 
changing the structure of relative within poverty. Put differently, while the issue of 
the focus on analysis on income distribution or in poverty is still debated in the 
political and academic discourse (Sutcliffe 2004), there is empirical evidence that the 
devolutionary process in Italy has been unable to stimulate a “pro-poor growth” 
(Sutcliffe, 2004, p.19) therefore contrasting with argument generally claiming  for a 
reduction of  poverty not inequality (Feldstein, 1999) in order to increase Pareto-
efficiency. 
Hence, it is reasonable to argue that overall reduction of regional disparities arising 
from higher economic growth  in the South of Italy is simply due to European 
transfers (Aiello and Pupo, 2009). Furthermore, the rise in percapita income was 
neither accompanied with any significant change in critical variables able to (explain 
and) stimulate self-enhancing  endogenous development nor with any reduction of 
regional poverty so that the positive signal consisting in the reduction of regional 
disparities could be essentially attributed to external factors, mainly income support 
measures, representing, rather than economic development, indices of persistent high 
economic dependency. 
 
In addition to different outcome of income support measures between South and the 
rest of the country – operating at the numerator level - closely considering the 
dynamic of population, which represents the denominator used to normalise income 
measures, it is worth noting that, as shown in Graph 15 below,  Southern population 
constantly decreased over the period ranging from 1996 (20667.8 thousands of 
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inhabitants)  to 2002 (20527.7 thousands of inhabitants) while Centre-North 
constantly increased over the whole period 1995-2009 passing from 36176.6  
thousands  to 39369.8 thousands, respectively. More precisely, according to the 
SVIMEZ Report (2009) between 1997 and 2008 the Mezzogiorno registered an 
outward flow of about 700 thousands inhabitants; Only in 2008 the internal 
migration in favour of Centre-Northern regions amounted to 122 thousand 
inhabitants the 87% of which coming from Campania (25 thousands), Puglia (12,2 
thousands), and Sicilia (11,6 thousands).  
 
INSERT GRAPH 15 ABOUT HERE 
. 
In principle, this internal migration is not a negative per se. Indeed, from a strictly 
economic point of view, according to a neoclassical paradigm, input factors mobility 
is a key factor to achieve higher economic performance. Nevertheless, from the 
devolutionary perspective, once considered also that the South-North flow is manly 
composed by high-skill worker (SVIMEZ, 2009), this circumstance is rather in 
contrast with the argument based on realising every place’s potential8, instead, it 
could be interpreted, once more, as a sort of exit (Hirschman 1985) option also in 
response to low performance of Southern local governments in stimulating economic 
development. However, undoubtedly the internal dynamic of population, in spite of 
the fact that it has been driven by the relatively low economic performance of 
Southern regions generating high unemployment rates, quite paradoxically, amplified 
the downward trend of percapita regional disparities. For example, in  2008, the 
share of Southern GDP on National GDP is about 24%  - substantially unchanged 
since 1951 - while the percapita value of the Southern share in the Centre-North 
GDP  (30.380 euros and 17.482 euros, respectively) is about 60% (SVIMEZ, 2008). 
This aspect is further investigated comparing the cumulative GDP growth between 
1995 and 2007 according to five different macro-areas. Graph 16(a), reporting 
percapita values, show that both the North-East and the North-West macro-area 
registered especially after 2000 a (cumulative) growth rate lower than the rest of the 
country. Moreover, the South, beginning from 1996, shows the highest economic 
performance between the macro-areas considered. Nonetheless,  once considered, in 
Graph 16(b), absolute values, the picture is quite different. Indeed, in this case, even 
if the North-West confirms a relative low cumulative growth, the North-East datum 
is higher than national growth for the whole period considered (even if both in 1998 
and 2001 the macro-areas registered cumulative growth substantially equal to the 
national one). Islands, in contrast to percapita values, show a downward trend since 
1998 joined by Southern macro-area since 2002, exactly one year later the 
                                                          
8
 The expression is mutated from the government document  “Local growth: realising every place's 
potential”  presented to the UK parliament by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & Skills 
in October 2010 (available online at http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/). 
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devolutionary Constitutional reform of 2001. Only the Centre seems to confirm the 
relative good economic performance according to both measures. 
 
INSERT GRAPH 16 ABOUT HERE 
 
Therefore, not considering the dynamic of population and its effects on regional – 
percapita – income, the ‘convergence’ process shows different magnitude and trends. 
Indeed, Gini index on absolute values – reported in Graph 17 below - range between 
maximum and minimum 0.509 (in 1995) and  0.504 (in 2002) substantially higher 
than the correspondent extremes registered by percapita figures: 0.135 and  0.113, in 
1995 and 2007 respectively. Put differently, a max-min difference in Gini index 
(absolute values) of only 0,005 results, due to population dynamic, in a difference 
(0,02) four times higher in percapita values. Moreover, the  continuous downward 
trend of regional disparities registered in the case of percapita values, is not 
confirmed by absolute values: although a reduction of disparities in absolute values 
arose during the period 1995-2001, beginning from 2002 (once more, just a year after 
the devolutionist Constitutional reform in 2001) regional disparities started back to 
increase.  
 
INSERT GRAPH 17 ABOUT HERE 
 
Certainly this dynamic of regional disparities, from a different angle, contributes to 
challenge the above mentioned argument in favour of positive effects of devolution 
in realising every place’s potential and, to the case at hand, casts considerable doubts 
about the overall disparities-reducing effects of devolution across Italian regions. 
As further analysis of potential beneficial effects of devolution on spatial disparities 
we consider also the issue of polarisation. Indeed, given also the strong spatial 
autocorrelation of  measure of income in Italy, expression of the North-South divide, 
from Esteban and Ray (1994), it is well known that income inequality measures 
could give a picture quite different from polarisation measures. More precisely, it 
could be the case that (at least) some Southern regions, stimulated also by the 
devolutionary trend, activate their own economic dynamic behaving, in terms of  
Esteban and Ray (1994), less as a single “cluster” reducing overall polarisation. At 
this end we use the Generalised Esteban, Gardìn and Ray (2007) (EGR) polarisation 
index 
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where 	μ′% and p% represent respectively the (corrected) average income and the 
numerical weight of group j; α ∈[1,1.6] is the parameter that captures the degree of 
sensitivity of our measure of polarisation, and β ≥ 	0 is the parameter used to express 
the weight assigned to the error term  Gf − Gρ∗ in determining group 
composition (for further details readers are addressed also to Esteban and Ray (1994) 
and to Duro (2005). It is well known that this measure involves the division of the 
original population into a number of significant homogeneous groups (within-
homogeneity condition) to obtain high heterogeneity between groups. Adopting the 
methodology proposed by Aghevli and Mehran (1981) and Davies and Shorrocks 
(1989) both the 2  and 3 groups case have been considered. Results  are reported in 
Table 1.   
 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
In computing this index, contrarily to expectations based on pro-devolution 
argument, both for the partition into 2 and into 3 groups, over the whole period 
considered (1995-2007) Southern regions (Abruzzi, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, 
Molise, Puglia, Sardinia, and Sicilia) belong to the lower-income group (or cluster) 
confirming the circumstance that their income dynamic follows a single trend over 
time. Instead, are Northern regions that are becoming relatively poorer. This 
phenomenon is particularly evident, for example, in 2001 in which, considering 3 
income groups9, 3 regions (Lombardy, Piedmont, Valle d'Aosta, and Veneto) and the 
Provincia Autonoma of Trento, register a shift from the hight income group to the 
medium income group with a consequent reduction of polarisation passing from 
0.023076 (in the previous year) to 0.021995. Table 2 reports the evolution of the 
subdivision of the whole set of regions into the 3 income groups following the 
Davies and Shorrocks (1989) algorithm. Namely, low income (group 1), medium 
income (group 2), and high income (group 3) according to upper and lower bounds 
reported, for each year, in Table 1.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
                                                          
9
 The income groups are defined using the Davies and Shorrocks (1989) algorithm. As reported in 
Table 1 for 2001 they are defined as follows. Low income between 9937.500 and 14266.739; Medium 
income between 14266.739 and 18688.316; High income between 18688.316 and 21008.000. Data are 
expressed in Purchasing Power Standard based on final consumption per inhabitant . 
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Graph 18 below reports the evolution of the EGR polarisation index (see column 7 in 
Table 1) over the period considered. 
 
INSERT GRAPH 18 ABOUT HERE 
 
Graph 18 shows a rather constant reduction, although modest in magnitude10, of 
polarisation over the period considered. Therefore, in terms of North-South divide, 
this evidence jointly considered with argument developed above about the relatively 
lower performance of Northern regions, the polarisation analysis seems to confirm 
that, rather than filling the gap, regions (or members) belonging to the Southern 
cluster are constantly "similar" over time. However, Northern regions, registering, as 
a whole, a relatively lower level of household income, are becoming less "dissimilar" 
from Southern ones, reducing the overall polarisation. 
To summarise, the overall evolution of regional disparities is far from showing a 
desirable opposite link with the devolutionary process. Indeed, on the empirical side, 
the reduction registered in percapita values is hardly linked with theoretical 
arguments proposing devolution as a socio-economic stimulating factor, and, the 
reduction of regional disparities itself, essentially driven by relative low performance 
of (richer) Northern regions, (i) appears to be ineffective in reducing within 
disparities, (ii) not supported by endogenous economic performance, and (iii) rather 
limited both in time and magnitude.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper critically considered the link between regional disparities and devolution 
in Italy. The analysis contributes to the existent literature empirically considering the 
historical path of a (sub-)set of socio-economic factors theoretically involved in a 
self-enforcing virtuous cycle including devolution as an initiating factors. In the 
Italian contest this kind of analysis unavoidably involve the issue of North-South 
divide.  
Contrarily to theoretical argument and previous Italian case-study, going further the 
consideration of high debated measure of fiscal devolution, our analysis shows that 
evolution of pivotal factors to regional development in the South is not able to 
explain the reduction of regional disparities in percapita GDHI registered over the 
period 1995-2007. Moreover, the reduction of between spatial disparities over this 
period has not been accompanied by any substantial reduction of South’s within 
poverty.  
                                                          
10
 The difference between the initial (0,02499) and final value (0,021625) considered is equal to 
0,003365.  
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Our interpretation of these findings, augmented with a polarization analysis, is that 
the process has been driven by the dynamic of population, generally ameliorating 
Southern percapita values, and by relative low performance of (richer) Northern 
regions. Clearly, this not implies that devolution has no positive effect of spatial 
economic performance and regional disparities; however these effects have to be 
further investigated and, moreover, might require more time in order to be effective 
in improving socio-economic factors and overall regional performance, especially in 
the South.  
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Figure 1- Regional disparities in 1996 and 2006.  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Percapita values. 
Source: authors’ elaboration on Eurostat (2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - The link between devolution and regional disparities in Italy 
 
 Source: Calamai (2009, p. 1146). 
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Graph 1 – Evolution of regional disparities
 
Gini index:  Gini index of regional  Gross Disposable Household Income per head (GDHI) 
Source: authors’ elaboration on Eurostat (2010) 
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Graph 2 – Evolution of regional disparities and fiscal devolution in Italy 
 
Fiscal Devolution:  share of local revenue on total  government revenue;  Gini index:  Gini index of 
regional  Gross Disposable Household Income per head (GDHI). 
Source: authors’ elaboration on Eurostat (2010) 
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Graph 3- Evolution of regional policy in Italy between 1950 and 1981 
 
Note: IRIP (Index of Regional Industrial Policy in relation to national industrial policy) is obtained by dividing the 
sum of investment in public and semipublic enterprises in Southern Italy (Is), subsidised interest loans for the 
development of Southern Italy (Fs) and investment grants in Southern Italy (G) by the national equivalent datum. In 
symbols IRIP = [(Is + Fs + G)/(I+F+G)]*100. IRP (Index of Regional Policy) is obtained by dividing the sum of 
investment in public and semipublic enterprises in Southern Italy (Is), subsidised interest loans for the development of 
Southern Italy (Fs), investment grants in Southern Italy (G),  public consumption in the South (Cm), and investment in 
public works in the South (IPm) by the  national equivalent datum. In symbols IRP= [(Is + Fs + G + Cs + IPs)/(l + F + 
G + C +IP)]. 
Source: authors’ elaboration on Del Monte and De Luzenberger (1989). 
 
 
Graph 4 – Evolution of transfer from EU 
 
 Source: authors’ elaboration on Regional Public Accounts 
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Graph 5 - Evolution of spatial disparities and spatial economic policy 
 
Gini index:  Gini index of regional  Gross Disposable Household Income per head (GDHI); Policy:  difference 
between Gini index of regional primary household income and Gini index of GDHI.   
Source: authors’ elaboration on data from Eurostat 
Graph 6 – Electoral participation 
 
 
 Source: authors’ elaboration on ISTAT (2010) 
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Graph 7 – Legality and Social Cohesion 
 
 Source: authors’ elaboration on data from ISTAT  
 
Graph 8 – Work conditions
 
 Source: authors’ elaboration on data from ISTAT  
5
10
15
20
25
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
North West North East 
Centre South 
Islands 
(violent crimes per 10.000 inhabitants)
Legality and Social Cohesion
5
10
15
20
25
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
North West North East 
Centre South 
Islands 
(share of irregular workers on total workers, percent)
Irregular work
 31 
 
 
Graph 9 – Workers Productivity  
 
  
 Source: authors’ elaboration on data from ISTAT  
 
Graph 10 – Innovation ability 
 
 Source: authors’ elaboration on data from ISTAT  
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Graph 11 – Tourism Attractiveness 
 
 Source: authors’ elaboration on data from ISTAT 
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Graph 12 – Economic Dependency 
 
 Source: authors’ elaboration on data from ISTAT 
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Graph 14 – Relative poverty 
 
  
Source: authors’ elaboration on data from ISTAT 
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Graph 15 – Evolution of Italian population, macro-areas. 
 
  
Source: authors’ elaboration on data from ISTAT
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Graph 17 – Evolution of regional disparities (GDHI in absolute values) 
 
Gini index:  Gini index of regional  Gross Disposable Household Income per head (GDHI) 
Source: authors’ elaboration on Eurostat (2010) 
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Graph 18 – Evolution of regional polarisation 
 
 EGR index of GDHI (percapita) regional polarization (n= 3, δ=1.6, λ= 1) 
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Regions abbreviations and macro-areas composition 
 
Nord-West 
Piedmont PI 
Valle d'Aosta/Vallée d'Aoste VA 
Liguria LI 
Lombardy LO 
Nord-East 
Provincia Autonoma Bolzano/Bozen  
Provincia Autonoma Trento  
Veneto VE 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia FR 
Emilia-Romagna ER 
Centre 
Toscana TO 
Umbria UM 
Marche MA 
Lazio LA 
South 
Abruzzi AB 
Molise MO 
Campania CM 
Puglia PU 
Basilicata BA 
Calabria CL 
Islands* 
Sicilia SI 
Sardegna SA 
 
*if not separately considered Islands are included in the South macro-area. 
